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Abstract 
Several empirical works have analyzed the determinants of being in informal sector. Most focus on the 
effect of socioeconomic factors such as level of education, regions of residence, skills acquired, and 
gender. The most recent works has find that institutional factors can influence decisions to undertake 
activities in the informal sector such as corruption, regulations and legislation (Hart, 2012; Schneider 
et al., 2010) or tax burden (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Ferraira-Tiryaki, 2008, Friedman and al, 2000, 
Frey and Torgler2007) but alternative explanation concerning the institutional factor include Portes 
(1994, 2005, 2010) and Burroni and al. ( 2008) concern the effect of institutional trust “Informality is 
curbed by institutional trust”. This article presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of being 
in informality for youth’s people in selected MENA countries (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and 
Tunisia) focusing on the effect of institutional trust. The analysis of the data suggests that the general 
level of young people’s trust in different institutions is low. The estimation results of discrete choice 
model using recent survey“ SAHWA “, confirm that youth’s people trusts in institutions have a 
significant effect on the likelihood of being in informality. However, it seems to differ according to 
witch institutions are considered and by countries.  
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1. Introduction  
Several empirical works have analyzed the determinants of being in informal sector. Most focus on the 
effect of socioeconomic factors such as level of education, localities and regions of residence, number 
of dependents, skills acquired, marital status, age and gender (Gallaway and Bernasek, 2002, Sassen-
Koob, 1989, Kesteloot and Meert, 1999, Williams, 2004, Schneider and al., 2001, Becker, 2004, 
Schneider and al., 2010, Loayza, 1996, Leonard, 1994, 1998, Venkatesh, 2006, Williams and Lansky, 
2013).  
 
The most recent works has find that institutional factors can influence decisions to undertake activities 
in the informal sector such as corruption (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Ferraira-Tiryaki, 2008), 
Regulations and legislation (Hart, 2012; Schneider and al., 2010) or tax burden (Schneider and Enste, 
2000; Ferraira-Tiryaki, 2008, Friedman and al, 2000, Frey and Torgler, 2007) but alternative 
explanation concerning the institutional factor include Portes (1994, 2005, 2010) and Burroni and al.             
(2008) concern the effect of institutional trust “Informality is curbed by institutional trust”. 
 
The existing literature, has failed to generate a consensus about the effect of institutional factors on the 
size of informality, and studies still remain largely under-explored especially in the case of Arab 
countries. However, in the most previous empirical studies, the institutional factors are using at macro 
level. On the other hand, undoubtedly, youth are placed on the top among age groups who are the most 
affected by informal employment. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of institutional factor following microeconomic 
approach. We test the effect of trust in institutions on youth behavior in the decision to exercise in the 
informal sector in the case of Arab countries (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia). Also 
we plane to conduct a comparative analysis between countries under study to check if youth in the 
region have similar levels of trust in institutions.  
 
Analyzing this effect is important in the Arab countries characterized by strong tensions in their labor 
market. Indeed, the latest social movements “Arab spring” supported by youth have shown the 
fragility of the labor market in these countries. 
 
In this paper we try to answer the following questions: 
▪ Are young people in the region having similar levels of trust in institutions?  
▪ Does Trust in institutions influence decisions of youth to exercise in the informal sector in the 
case in Arab countries? 
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The measurement of the trust institutions remains complex, it’s difficult to measure it directly by a 
single observed indicator. The most common way is measuring it by using several indicators such as 
trust in the parliament, in politicians, in political parties, legal system, the government,…(Daniele and 
Geys 2015, Oorschot, Roosma, & Gelissen 2014, Carlson 2016, Marien 2011). 
 
The paper is organized as follows:  in Section 2, we review the existing literature on determinant of 
informality.  Section 3 describes the data sources and methods adopted in our analysis.  Section 4 
discusses the descriptive results to contextualize and motivate our analyses.  Section 5 presents our 
empirical results, and finally Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature on determinant of informality 
The existing literature has revealed different factors which influence decisions to undertake activities 
in the informal sector or otherwise. We can divide the literature according to the nature of the factors 
in two major parts: "socioeconomic and demographic factors" and "institutional factors" 
 
It have all been proven that socioeconomic and demographic factors have an influence on people’s 
propensity to engage in informal transactions such as level of education (Gallaway and Bernasek, 
2002), localities and regions of residence (Sassen-Koob, 1989, Kesteloot and Meert, 1999), income 
level (Williams, 2004), number of dependents (Schneider and al., 2001), skills acquired (Becker, 
2004), marital status (Schneider and al., 2001), age and gender (Becker, 2004, Loayza, 1996,  
Leonard, 1994, 1998, Venkatesh, 2006, Williams, 2013). 
 
Institutional factor is another drivers underpinning the decision to enter in informality such as tax 
burden, regulations and legislation and corruption. 
 
Many papers dealing with informal sector put forward tax burden. Rising tax burden leads to higher 
sizes of informal sector (Giles and al., 2000; Sookram and Watson, 2008). But there is no consensus 
about the direction of the effect of tax on the size of informality, some studies (Frey and Pommerehne 
(1984),  Schneider (1994,1997), Tanzi (1999), Davis and Henrekson  (2004)) in where taxes are left 
out to play an exogenous role, found  a positive correlation between taxes and informal sector size but 
several recent cross-section and panel data empirical studies, allowing for the possible endogeneity of 
taxes, associate higher taxes with a smaller size of the informal economy (Johnson. al. (1997), Johnson 
and. al. (1998), Friedman and  al.  (2000), and Torgler and Schneider (2007)). 
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Regulations and legislation such as labor market regulation and social security legislation have been 
found to have a significant influence on decisions to participate in the informal economy (Hart, 2012; 
Schneider and al., 2010). For example excessive regulation of the labor market, through minimum 
wages can increase the size of the informal economy (Schneider and Enste, 2000). Else, social security 
contributions increase the cost of labor in the formal economy, and hence increase the size of the 
informal economy (Schneider and al., 2010). 
 
Some studies have observed that the size of a country’s informal economy increases with corruption. 
Corruption makes agents flee into the informal economy (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Ferraira-Tiryaki, 
2008, Friedman and al., 2000). Conversely, other studies (Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2012) 
consider corruption beneficial to economies with a large informal sector and weak institutions. 
 
However, the literature that emphasizes institutional determinants also implicitly suggests that trust in 
institutions should have an effect on people behavior in the decision to undertake activities in the 
informal sector. Portes (1994, 2005, 2010) postulates that trust in formal institutions inhibits people’s 
tendency to engage in informal activities. Burroni and al. ( 2008) explained that the emergence and 
rise of the informal sector cannot be simply explained by economic pressures, it is strongly influenced 
by others factors such as the absence of institutional trust. 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
We use the SAHWA Youth Survey data which concern young people between 15 and 29 years-old in 
Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia conducted amongst 10,000 young (2000 per country) 
between 2015 and 2016. The main topics under study in the SAHWA project are education, 
employment and social inclusion, political mobilization and participation, culture and values, 
international migration and mobility, gender, comparative experiences in other transitional contexts 
and public policies, and international cooperation. The survey contains items which measure 
respondents’ trust in institutions such as parliament, political parties, the legal system, and 
government. 
 
First, we start with descriptive analysis of used variables of SAHWA data survey  and then we use the 
Chi-Square test of independence to determine if there is a significant relationship between our two 
principals variables “being or not in informality” and different institutional trust variables considered 
in our analysis.   
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Second, we use empirical methods to analyze the determinant of informality among youth including 
institutional trust variables. The main analysis consists of estimating a logit model which allows us to 
estimate the impact of institutional trust variables on the likelihood of being in informality measuring 
by not being insured by social security. We control with others explanatory variables (socio-
demographics, …). Being in informality can be formalized by a discrete choice structure Yi = 1 if 
individual “i” is in informality and Yi = 0 if not.  
4. Descriptive Statistics 
The analysis of the data suggests that the general level of young people’s trust in different institutions 
is low. It seems to differ in relation to which political institutions are considered more or less 
trustworthy.  
 
Figure 1: Frequencies of youth having no confidence at all in the different institutions by country 
 
 
 
Source: Constructed by authors using Sahwa Data survey. 
 
Lebanon presents higher levels of no confidence at all in parliament, administration in general, 
government and elections. Higher levels of no confidence at all in foreign media and employers are 
observed in Egypt. Tunisia observes higher levels of no confidence at all in elected local officials and 
religious associations. Morocco observes higher levels of no confidence at all in people in general and 
national media. We note that in Algeria the frequency of youth who have no confidence at all in the 
different institutions still not the highest compared to the other four countries. 
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Egypt observes higher frequencies of higher confidence in government and people in general. Algeria 
observes this trend in confidence in legal system, parliament, political parties, employers, national 
media, associations and unions, local administration and administration in general. 
 
Figure 2: Frequencies of youth having high confidence in the different institutions by country 
 
Source: Constructed by authors using Sahwa Data survey. 
 
We used the Chi-Square of independence to determine if there is a significant relationship between our 
two principle variables “being or not in informality” and different institutional trust variables 
considered in our analysis.  
 
The null hypothesis for this test is that there is no relationship between two variables X and Y.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that there is a relationship between X and Y. The table below display the 
frequency of each variable is compared across the second variable and the associated probability of 
Chi-Square test. 
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Table 1: Results of Chi-Square test 
 Formal Informal Chi2 
Confidence in parliament 51.04 50.58 NS 
Confidence in political parties 53.69 48.09 *** 
Confidence in elected local officials 64.17 57.84 *** 
Confidence in local administration 67.82 60.17 *** 
Confidence in administration in  general 63.82 58.83 ** 
Confidence in associations and  unions 68.20 57.98 *** 
Confidence in government 58.99 61.45 NS 
Confidence in elections 60.48 59.68 NS 
Confidence in national media 82.03 74.20 *** 
Confidence in foreign media 74.31 64.18 *** 
Confidence in religious associations  79.61        71.71       *** 
Confidence in people in general 89.63       84.40 *** 
Confidence in the legal system  77.76        70.13  *** 
Confidence in employers  60.32        49.42 *** 
Corruption taking  place in country 93.28       90.50 ** 
Encountered  nepotism  43.43        29.29  *** 
Political  system allows people to 
have a say on the government's actions 
75.18 70.72 NS 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The results show that there is a significant relationship between the majority of our institutional trust 
variables and the variable “being or not in informality”. 
 
5. Results and Analysis 
The table below displays the odds ratio of the logit model that explains the determinant of informality 
(not being insured by social security) by country (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco). 
 
Table 2: Determinants of being in the informality - odds ratio 
  
Algeria Egypt Lebanon Tunisia Morocco 
Socio-demographic      
Gender Female (ref) 
Male  
 
0.838 
(0.253) 
 
1.312 
(0.430) 
 
0.756 
(0.171) 
 
1.160 
(0.293) 
 
0.394** 
(0.180) 
Marital status (Ever Married –Ref) 
Never Married  
 
1.106 
(0.435) 
  
3.129*** 
(0.795) 
 
1.529* 
(0.336) 
 
2.413*** 
(0.795) 
 
1.722 
(0.618) 
Age of the  first job 0.774*** 
(0.0333) 
0.941* 
(0.0313) 
0.930* 
(0.0347) 
0.925** 
(0.0334) 
0.853*** 
(0.0410) 
Urban 
Rural (ref) 
0.870 
(0.220) 
1.071 
(0.281) 
0.461*** 
(0.108) 
0.814 
(0.226) 
0.818 
(0.288) 
Human capital       
Level of education (primary and less (ref))      
Middle 0.416* 
(0.214) 
1.326 
(0.799) 
1.010 
(0.442) 
1.211 
(0.536) 
1.894 
(0.811) 
Secondary 0.330** 
(0.181) 
0.530 
(0.237) 
0.691 
(0.311) 
0.680 
(0.295) 
1.518 
(0.627) 
Higher 0.0617*** 
(0.0398) 
0.201*** 
(0.110) 
0.338** 
(0.166) 
0.404* 
(0.196) 
0.669 
(0.377) 
Have you had professional training No (Ref) 0.674 
(0.172) 
5.036 
(6.700) 
1.356 
(0.457) 
1.023 
(0.278) 
0.547 
(0.360) 
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Household characteristics   
 
    
Father level instruction Below Secondary (Ref) 
 
    
Secondary and Higher 0.897 
(0.298) 
0.572* 
(0.183) 
0.583* 
(0.169) 
0.629 
(0.194) 
1.922 
(1.015) 
Mother level instruction Below Secondary (Ref) 
 
    
Secondary and Higher 0.600 
(0.234) 
1.091 
(0.440) 
1.502 
(0.437) 
0.945 
(0.364) 
0.292** 
(0.166) 
Father insured by the social security system No (Ref) 0.522 
(0.374) 
0.510** 
(0.136) 
1.098 
(1.060) 
0.772 
(0.198) 
0.635 
(0.252) 
Mother insured by the social security system No 
(Ref) 
1.186 
(0.810) 
0.408* 
(0.197) 
0.225 
(0.218) 
1.087 
(0.309) 
0.183*** 
(0.0933) 
Institution trust  
 
    
Confidence on Parliament No (Ref) 0.501 
(0.222) 
1.420 
(0.630) 
1.364 
(0.434) 
0.819 
(0.290) 
0.794* 
(0.0948) 
Confidence on Political parties No (Ref) 2.384* 
(1.126) 
0.441** 
(0.173) 
0.551* 
(0.170) 
1.764 
(0.622) 
1.136 
(0.180) 
Confidence on elected local officials No (Ref) 0.810 
(0.328) 
1.289 
(0.614) 
0.911 
(0.311) 
1.956* 
(0.730) 
0.970 
(0.142) 
Confidence on local administration  No (Ref) 1.862 
(1.222) 
1.439 
(0.738) 
0.920 
(0.330) 
1.166 
(0.484) 
1.320 
(0.257) 
Confidence on administration in general No (Ref) 0.581 
(0.377) 
1.098 
(0.489) 
1.228 
(0.429) 
2.263* 
(0.987) 
0.723* 
(0.136) 
Confidence in associations and unions No (Ref) 2.186** 
(0.803) 
0.877 
(0.313) 
0.961 
(0.321) 
0.237*** 
(0.0928) 
1.087 
(0.204) 
Confidence in government No (Ref) 0.509* 
(0.206) 
1.393 
(0.721) 
1.246 
(0.440) 
0.927 
(0.353) 
1.158 
(0.193) 
Confidence in elections No (Ref) 0.994 
(0.386) 
1.454 
(0.605) 
1.057 
(0.340) 
0.637 
(0.228) 
0.971 
(0.146) 
Confidence in national Media No (Ref) 1.069 
(0.446) 
0.776 
(0.307) 
0.961 
(0.350) 
0.944 
(0.352) 
1.189 
(0.197) 
Confidence in foreign Media    No (Ref)                            1.495 
(0.470) 
1.701* 
(0.487) 
0.678 
(0.220) 
0.910 
(0.345) 
0.676*** 
(0.0941) 
Confidence in people in general No (Ref) 0.859 
(0.343) 
0.829 
(0.379) 
0.608* 
(0.177) 
0.435** 
(0.152) 
1.056 
(0.169) 
Confidence in legal system No (Ref) 0.652 
(0.254) 
0.432 
(0.246) 
1.348 
(0.488) 
1.007 
(0.361) 
1.028 
(0.118) 
Confidence in Employers No (Ref) 0.952 
(0.299) 
0.865 
(0.261) 
0.733 
(0.203) 
1.941** 
(0.570) 
1.314 
(0.221) 
Corruption currently takes place in your country No 
(Ref) 
0.726 
(0.440) 
0.488 
(0.233) 
1.689 
(1.307) 
6.497* 
(6.504) 
2.027** 
(0.720) 
Encountered to nepotism No (Ref) 0.528*** 
(0.126) 
0.414** 
(0.152) 
0.489*** 
(0.0985) 
0.711 
(0.179) 
1.025 
(0.344) 
Political system in your country allow people No 
(Ref) 
     
Yes 1.366 
(0.357) 
2.125 
(1.849) 
0.664 
(0.815) 
2.969 
(2.556) 
1.982 
(0.920) 
Constant 3,278*** 
(4,238) 
25.08** 
(32.12) 
66.22** 
(110.9) 
0.953 
(1.462) 
33.40*** 
(34.03) 
Observations 493 616 667 492 414 
 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of the estimations of our models show that institutional trust has a significant impact on the 
probability of being in informality. However, it seems to differ according to witch institutions are 
considered and between countries. 
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For Socio-demographic variables, we find that: 
Gender has significant effect on the probability of being in the informality only for the case of 
Morocco. Male is less likely to be insured comparatively to female. It is probably due to the nature of 
the predominant activity in Morocco which is Agriculture. 
The stratum of residence has only a significant effect on informality for the case of Lebanon. Youth 
living in urban areas are less likely to be in informality than those living in rural areas. 
However, for all the countries considered, the results show that education has a significant negative 
impact on informality. In the case for Algeria, we find that the likelihood to be in informality decrease 
with the education level. Youth with middle education level have 2.4 less risk to be in the informal 
sector comparatively to youth with primary and less education level and youth with secondary 
education level have 3 less risk to be in the informal sector comparatively to youth with primary and 
less education level. Youth with higher education level have 16.20 less risk to be in the informal sector 
comparatively to youth with primary and less education level.  
 
The age at the first job have a significant negative effect on informality in the case of all countries 
considered. The result show that more we start working youngest more we are in the informality.  
 
Focusing on institutional trust variables, we find: 
Confidence on political parties is significant for three countries. However, the effect differs between 
countries, we find a positive effect for Algeria and a negative effect for Egypt and Lebanon. 
It appears that Algerian youth who have a confidence on political parties are more likely to be in the 
informality (youth who have a confidence on political parties have 2,38 more risk  to be in the 
informal sector comparatively to who don't have  it). In the other side, Egyptians and Lebanon youth  
who have a confidence on political parties are less likely to be in the informality (Egyptians youth who 
have a confidence on political parties have 2.27  less risk  to be in the informal sector comparatively to 
who don't have it (respectively 1.81 for Lebanon youth). 
 
Confidence on elected local officials is significant only for Tunisia. It appear that youth who have a 
confidence on elected local officials are more likely to be in the informal sector (youth who have a 
confidence on elected local officials have 1,96 more risk  to be in the informal sector comparatively to 
who don't have it).  
 
Confidence on administration in general is significant for Tunisia and Morocco but the effect differs. 
The effect is positive for Tunisia and negative for Morocco. In Tunisia, who have a confidence on 
administration in general are more likely to be in the informality (youth who have a confidence on 
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administration in general have 2,26  more risk  to be in the informal sector comparatively to who don't 
have it). However, in Morocco, who have a confidence on administration in general have 1.38 less risk 
to be in the informal sector. 
 
Confidence in associations and unions is significant with opposite effect between Algeria and Tunisia.  
Algerian youth who have a confidence in associations and unions have 2,18  more risk  to be in the 
informal sector comparatively to who don't have it. However, in Tunisia who have a confidence in 
associations and unions have 4.22 less risk to be in the informal sector. 
 
Confidence in government is only significant for the case of Algeria. Youth who have a confidence on 
government are less likely to be in the informal sector (youth who have a confidence on government 
have 1.96 less risk  to be in the informal sector comparatively to who don't have it). 
 
Confidence in foreign Media is significant for Egypt and Morocco but with opposite effect. The effect 
is positive for the case of Egypt in which youth who have a confidence on foreign Media have 1.70 
more risk to be in the informal sector comparatively to who don't have it. Unlike Moroccans youth 
who trust on foreign Media have 1.48 less risk to be in the informal sector. 
 
Confidence in people in general has a negative significant effect in Lebanon and Tunisia. Youth who 
have a confidence in people in general are less likely to be in the informal sector. In Lebanon, youth 
who have a confidence in people in general have 1.65 less risk to be in the informal sector 
comparatively to who don't have it (respectively 2.30 in Tunisia). 
 
Confidence in Employers is only significant for the case of Lebanon. Youth who have a confidence in 
Employers have 1.94 more risk to be in the informal sector comparatively to who don't have it.  
 
For both Tunisia and Morocco, youth who think that corruption currently takes place in their country 
are less likely to be in the informal sector. Tunisian youth who think that corruption currently takes 
place in their country have 6.50 more risk to be in the informal comparatively to who don't think it 
(respectively 2.03 in Morocco). 
 
Encountered nepotism has a significant negative effect on being in the informality for three countries 
(Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon). Youth who ever have encountered nepotism have less risk to be in the 
informal sector comparatively to who never encountered it. Algerian Youth who ever have 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association 
Vol. 21, Issue No. 2, May 2019  
 
 
43 
 
encountered nepotism have 1.89 less risk to be in the informal sector comparatively to who never 
encountered it (respectively 2.41 in Egypt and 2.04 in Lebanon). 
 
6. Conclusion 
This research has shown that institutional trust has a significant impact on the probability of being in 
the informality. We find some important results, which can be summarized in the following points:         
1) The general level of young people’s trust in the different institutions is low. However, it seems to 
differ in relation to which political institutions are considered more or less trustworthy. 2) Youth 
people trust in institutions have a significant effect on the likelihood of being in informality. 
However, it seems to differ according to witch institutions are considered and by countries.                        
3) Confidence on political parties is significant for three countries. However, the effect differs 
between countries. We find a positive effect for Algeria and a negative effect for Egypt and Lebanon. 
4) Confidence on elected local officials is significant only for Tunisia. 5) Confidence on 
administration in general is significant for Tunisia and Morocco but the effect differs. 6) Confidence 
in foreign Media is significant for Egypt and Morocco but with opposite effect. The effect is positive 
for Tunisia and negative for Morocco. 7) Confidence in associations and unions is significant with 
opposite effect between Algeria and Tunisia. 8) Confidence in government is only significant for the 
case of Algeria. 9) Confidence in foreign Media is significant for Egypt and Morocco but with 
opposite effect. 10) Confidence in people in general has a negative significant effect in Lebanon and 
Tunisia. 11) For both Tunisia and Morocco, youth who think that corruption currently takes place in 
their country are less likely to be in the informal sector. 12) Encountered nepotism has a significant 
negative effect on being in the informality for three countries (Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon). 
          
         Our Findings suggest that enhancing the level of youth's trust in institutions can decrease the level of 
the informality and therefore improve the Government Performance. The government must create 
political stability, and improve the condition of law and order, to improve institutions quality in order 
to increase the level of trust among individuals and improve the confidence of people on political and 
public institutions.  
 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association 
Vol. 21, Issue No. 2, May 2019  
 
 
44 
 
Bibliography  
 
-Adriaenssens,S. and Hendrick, J. 2015.“Can informal economic activities be explained by social and 
institutional factors? A comparative analysis”, Socio-Economic Review, 1–23. 
-Becker, K.2004. “The Informal Economy. SIDA Fact Finding Study”, SIDA3630en. 
-Burroni, L., Crouch, C., Kaminska, M. E. and Valzania, A. 2008. 'Local Economic Governance in 
Hard Times: The Shadow Economy and the Textile and Clothing Industries around Łodz and Naples', 
Socio- Economic Review, 6, 473–492. 
-Carlson, P. 2016. “Trust and health in Eastern Europe: Conceptions of a new society. International 
Journal of Social Welfare”, 25, 69–77. 
-Davis, S.J.  and Henrekson, M. 2004. “Tax Effects on Work Activity, Industry Mix, and Shadow 
Economy Size: Evidence from Rich-Country Comparison,", Cambridge, MA: NBER Working Paper 
w10572, June 2004. 
-Daniele, G., and Geys, B. 2015. “Interpersonal trust and welfare state support”. European Journal of 
Political Economy, 39: 1–12.  
- Dobson, S. and Ramlogan-Dobson, C. 2012. "Inequality, corruption and the informal sector," 
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 104-107. 
-Ferraira-Tiryaki, G., 2008. “The informal economy and business cycles”. Journal of Applied Economics, 
11 (1), 91-117. 
-Frey, B.S and Pommerehne, WW. 1984. “The Hidden Economy: State and Prospects for Measurement”, 
Review of income and Wealth, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, vol 30, pp 1-23. 
-Frey, B.S and Torgler, B. 2007.“Tax morale and conditional cooperation”, Journal of Comparative 
Economics 3(136–159). 
-Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kauffman,D.,  Zoido-Lobato, P. 2000.“Dodging the grabbing hand: the 
determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 76, issue 3, 459-493. 
-Gallaway, J. and Bernasek, A. 2002. “Gender and informal sector employment in Indonesia”. Journal of 
Economic Issues, XXXVI (2), June, 313-321. 
-Giles, D.E.A. and Johnson, B. J. 2000.”Taxes, Risk-Aversion, and the Size of the Underground Economy:  
A Nonparametric Analysis with New Zealand Dat”,. Econometrics Working Paper 0006, Department of 
Economics, University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C., Canada. 
-Hart, K. 2012. “How the informal economy took over the world”, available online at: 
http://thememorybank.co.uk/...-economy/ 
-Johnson, S., Kaufman, D., and Shleifer, A. 1997. “The Unofficial Economy in Transition”, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 159-221.  
-Johnson, S., Kaufman, D. and Zoido-Lobaton, P. 1998. “Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial 
Economy,” American Economic Review, 88: 387-392. 
-Kesteloot, C. and H. Meert.1999. 'Informal spaces: the geography of informal economic activities in 
Brussels', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23(2), 232–51. 
-Leonard M.1994.  Informal Economic Activity in Belfast. Aldershot: Avebury.  
-Leonard M.1998. “Invisible Work, Invisible Workers: the informal economy in Europe and the US, 
London: Macmillan. 
-Loayza, N. 1996. “The economics of the informal sector: a simple model and some empirical evidence 
from Latin America”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 45, 129-162. 
-Marien, S. (2011). “Measuring political trust across time and space”. In S. Z. and M. Hooghe (Ed.), 
Political trust. Why context matters. ECPR Press. 
-Oorschot, W. Van, Roosma, F., &Gelissen, J. (2014). “Perceptions of mistargeting of social security 
benefits in European countries”. Bulletin Luxembourgeois Des Questions Sociales, 21–46. 
-Portes, A. 1994. 'The Informal Economy and Its Paradoxes'. In Smelser, N. J. and Swedberg, R. (eds) The 
Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 426-449.   
-Portes, A.1998. 'Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology', Annual Review of 
Sociology, 24, 1-24. 
-Portes, A.2010. “Economic Sociology: A Systematic Inquiry” , Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association 
Vol. 21, Issue No. 2, May 2019  
 
 
45 
 
-Portes, A. and Haller, W. 2005.”The Informal Economy”, In Smelser, N. J. and Swedberg, R. (eds) The 
Handbook of Economic Sociology, 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 403-425. 
-Sassen-Koob, S., 1989. “New York City’s informal economy”. In A. Portes, M. Castells, and L., Benton 
(Eds.).The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press. 
-Schneider, F., 1994.”Measuring the size and development of the shadow economy. Can the causes be 
found and the obstacles be overcome?”. Essays on economic psychology, Springer, pp 193-212. 
 
-Schneider, F., 1997.”The shadow economies of Western Europe”. Economic Affairs, Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, vol 17,pp 42-48. 
-Schneider, F. and Enste, D., 2000. “Shadow Economies Around the World: Sizes, Causes, and 
Consequences”. Journal of Economic Literature, 38 (1), 77-114. 
-Schneider, F., Braithwaite, V. and Reinhart, M. 2001. “Individual behaviour in Australia’s shadow 
economy: facts, empirical findings and some mysteries”. Working Paper No. 19, Australia: Australian 
National University. 
-Schneider, F. and Enste H. 2003. “The Shadow Economy: An International Survey”, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University. 
-Schneider, F., Buehn, A., and Montenegro, C., 2010. “Shadow Economies All over the World: New 
Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007”. World Bank Policy Research Paper 5356. 
-Sookram, S., and P. K. Watson. 2008. 'Small-Business Participation in the Informal Sector of an 
Emerging Economy'. Journal of Development Studies 44: 15-31. 
-Tanzi, V. 1999. “Uses and Abuses of Estimates of the Underground Economy”, The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 109, No. 456. 
-Torgler, B. and Schneider, F .2007.”The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional Quality on the Shadow 
Economy”). IZA Discussion Paper 
-Venkatesh, S.A.2006.“Off the Books: The Underground Economy of the Urban Poor”. Cambridge, MA: 
Havard University Press. 
-Williams,c. 2004. “Cash-in-hand work: The underground sector and the hidden economy of favours “, 
springer. 
-Williams,c. MA Lansky. 2013.” Informal employment in developed and developing economies: 
Perspectives and policy responses”, International Labour Review 152 (3-4), 355-380. 
-Williams, CC.2013. “Beyond the formal economy: evaluating the level of employment in informal sector 
enterprises in global perspective”. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, 18(4), 
-Zmerli, S., Hooghe, M. (2011). “Political trust : why context matters”. ECPR Press. 
 
 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association 
Vol. 21, Issue No. 2, May 2019  
 
 
46 
 
Annex 
 
Confidence Parliament Confidence in political parties 
  
Confidence in politicians Confidence in elected local officials 
  
Confidence in local administration Confidence in administration in general 
  
Confidence in associations and unions Confidence in government 
  
Confidence in elections Confidence in national media 
  
Confidence in foreign media Confidence in people in general 
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Confidence in legal system Confidence in employers 
  
 
 
